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Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate
Asset: Electronic Data, Identity Theft,
Personal Information, and the Role of Data
Security in the Information Age
Kenneth M. Siegel*
I. Introduction
A. Today's Business Environment: No Longer Defined by Bricks and
Mortar
As new technologies have developed, business processes have
changed dramatically. Changes in technology continue to allow
businesses to increase efficiency, increase productivity, manage supply
and distribution chains, interact with customers, and increase
profitability. Today, a consumer might purchase an item from a
company using the company's e-commerce website. The consumer pays
with a credit card and can track the order until it reaches his or her door.
The seller uses sophisticated software management programs that
simultaneously update inventory when the order is shipped and reorder
from suppliers if inventory levels are too low. In some cases, the seller's
software programs communicate with its business partners and items the
seller does not yet have in inventory are shipped directly to the
consumer. At the same time, the company's financial records are
updated with sales and any purchases of raw goods. In many cases,
funds are transferred electronically.
Technology has not only created an online marketplace; it has also
redefined the process by which traditional "brick and mortar" companies,
and even service businesses, operate. Customers can swipe a debit card
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, (2007); M.S.I.S. Candidate, Pennsylvania State University, The Capital
College, (2007); B.S., Management Information Systems, Gannon University summa cur
laude (2004).
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and automatically pay for a purchase. They can check their bank
accounts online. Consumers can use their cellular phones to place orders
and their laptop computers to conduct business during their lunch break
at the park.
As technology has changed the business landscape, the risk
management concerns of companies utilizing technology have changed
as well. Protecting consumer data is no longer a matter of locking the
file cabinet. At one time technology was used to keep and manage only
internal company records, so securing internal databases might have been
the chief method by which companies protected consumer information.
This is no longer the case, as companies make customer information
available to business partners using the Internet. Data is also exchanged
through wireless connections and shared between companies or divisions
located in different countries.
What must a company do to protect its customers' personal data?
What does the law require? Is it feasible for the law to make technology-
specific requirements when technology is often replaced by new
technology every few years or even months?
B. Information: The Catalyst of Today's Business Environment
Identity theft is a serious problem, which can affect even the most
sophisticated consumers.' Over nine million Americans were victims of
identity theft in 2004.2 Identity theft, in the United States, has cost
nearly $53 billion each year over the last three years.3 Consumers pay $5
billion of that cost directly.4 The rest is paid by businesses and is
absorbed indirectly by consumers in the form of higher prices.5 Despite
the fact that criminals have a thorough understanding of the value of
personal information, law enforcement is not very successful at catching
criminals who commit identity theft.6 Less than 1 in 700 identity crimes
ends with a conviction.7 In addition to suffering monetary loss, the
1. Steven Levy & Brad Stone, Grand Theft Identity, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 2005, at
38. This article discusses the story of Deborah Platt Majoras, a recent victim of identity
theft. Majoras, coincidentally, is the chairperson of the federal agency most concerned
with identity theft, the Federal Trade Commission. Id.
2. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT 11
(2005), http://www.javelinstrategy.com/reports/2005IdentityFraudSurveyReport.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY].
3. Id. at 3.
4. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
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typical victim of identity theft can expect to devote about 175 hours
investigating and filling out paperwork to recover from identity theft,
sometimes dealing with the repercussions for several months or even
years.
8
The good news, at least from the perspective of an information
technology ("IT") manager, is most thieves still steal personal
information through off-line rather than online methods. 9 The likelihood
of large losses is still greater from off-line theft than online theft.'0
However, recent breaches in data security suggest this is about to change.
In August 2005, Sunbelt Software, a security firm, discovered passwords
for online accounts and credit card numbers stolen by a Trojan virus"
stored on a server in the United States. 12 In June 2005, forty million
Discover, Visa, MasterCard, and American Express numbers were
potentially exposed to hackers 3 because of insufficient security by a
company called CardSystems. 14  The large number of individuals
potentially affected by recent data breaches and the realization that theft
from large data warehouses could drastically increase the amount of data
stolen during a single security breach have created a need to make
electronically collected and stored personal information more secure. 15
Additionally, these events have led some to question what corporations
8. Id.
9. See 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
10. Id. In cases where the method of theft was known, 68.2% of stolen information
was obtained off-line, compared to 11.6% obtained online. Id. Mean loss from
information stolen by fraudulent email solicitations was $2,320, while information taken
from the theft of paper mail was $9,243, and information stolen from family and friends
was $15,607. Id. This discrepancy makes sense when one considers that the detection
time for online transactions is much less than paper transactions. For example, the mean
fraud detection time in cases involving paper statements mailed on a thirty-day cycle was
114 days compared to 18 days for detection in cases where consumers monitored their
accounts through the Internet or using an ATM. Id. Sadly, family and friends account
for over half of all identity theft. Id.
11. A Trojan virus is named after the Greek war story, in which soldiers hid inside a
wooden horse to enter the enemy city. GERALD V. POST & DAVID L. ANDERSON,
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS: SOLVING BUSINESS PROBLEMS WITH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 173, 588 (4th ed. 2006). Similarly, a Trojan virus is malicious code that is
hidden inside another program. Id. When the main program is run, the malicious code is
also run, usually without the user's knowledge. Id. The malicious code then might delete
files, display messages, or capture data and transmit it to an external source. Id.
12. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
13. In addition to the common understanding that a "hacker" is someone who breaks
into computer systems, the term "hacker" can also refer to "someone who learns about
computer code, networks, and systems in an effort to understand them and correct
errors." TAMARA DEAN, ENHANCED NETWORK+ GUIDE TO NETWORKS 758 (2003). In this
comment, "hacker" will be used, in the way it is commonly understood by the public, to
mean someone who attempts to exploit code or a network for malicious purposes.
14. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
15. Id.
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are doing to secure personal data. 16
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), under its authority of
Section 5 of the FTC Act, 17 which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices,
has brought cases against corporations failing to live up to their promises
about the security they provide for consumer information.18 While
companies that maintain financial' 9 and health information 20 must
comply with specific security requirements, companies collecting and
maintaining other types of information must comply only with the
promises they make to their customers.2 ' This Comment will evaluate
the need for corporations to develop and implement security programs
that protect consumer data and the need for uniform legislation that
provides minimum requirements for all entities that collect personal
information from consumers. Part II will examine the importance of
electronic data in today's corporate environment and outline the potential
risks associated with using electronic data. Part III will explore the data
security requirements that exist under current law. Part IV will look at
recent actions taken by the FTC to protect consumer data in situations
where the law does not currently require specific security measures. An
analysis of the action taken by the FTC will help determine what a
corporation should consider when developing a data security program.
Part V will recommend considerations that legislation directed at
electronic data security should address. From these considerations,
companies that are interested in developing data security systems and
consumers who are concerned about losing their personal data should be
able to formulate effective plans of action for future transactions
involving electronic data. Part VI concludes.
II. Background
The flow of information on the characteristics of customers, both
businesses and individuals, and changes in information technology in
recent years, have improved the efficiency, innovativeness and
competitiveness of our markets. This information has enabled
producers and marketers to fine-tune production schedules to the ever
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
18. Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/
privacyinitiatives/promises.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2005) [hereinafter FTC Privacy
Initiatives].
19. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006).
20. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. FTC Privacy Initiatives, supra note 18.
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greater demands of our consuming public for diversity and
individuality of products and services.
Today it is estimated that eighty percent of corporate assets are
digital.23  As a result of the prevalence of electronic assets, security of
data, networks, and software applications has become an issue that must
be addressed from an organizational risk management level.24 Over sixty
data breaches occurred in the first half of 2005 alone.25 Consequently,
over fifty million personal records have been exposed to possible
criminal misuse. 26 As former Chairman Greenspan suggests, information
drives today's markets. 27  E-business has increased efficiency and
profitability and created better customer service. 28 However, e-business
has also brought sensitive consumer data online, where it might be
exposed to theft or manipulation.29
Reports of identity theft have inundated the media in the last year.30
However, identity theft was prevalent even before the recent media
attention.3 1  In 2002, for example, there were twice as many reported
22. Alan Greenspan, Fair Credit Reporting Act question submitted to Chairman
Greenspan in writing following February 12, 2003 hearing, House Financial Service
Committee response received Feb. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.protectconsumercredit.org/what others/Greenspan.asp.
23. JODY R. WESTBY, ROADMAP TO AN ENTERPRISE SECURITY PROGRAM 12 (2005)
[hereinafter WESTBY].
24. Id.
25. Press Release, Vontu, Vontu Introduces the Industry's Only Solution to
Discover, Monitor, and Prevent Loss of Consumer Data and Intellectual Property (July
25, 2005), available at http://www.vontu.com/news/release- detail.asp?id=314.
26. Id.
27. See Greenspan, supra note 22.
28. John R. Vacca, Securing "Open" Corporate Networks, E-BuSINEss ADVISOR,
Aug. 2002, at 33.
29. See Press Release, Kavado, Why Network Security is not Enough: Kavado and
Security Innovation to Co-Host Free Webcast (March 1, 2005), available at
http://www.kavado.com/news/press-release-detail.asp?id=66.
30. On February 15, 2005, ChoicePoint announced that it had suffered a data breach
that could affect nearly 150,000 individuals. A Chronology of Data Breaches Reported
Since the ChoicePoint Incident (2005), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006). Since ChoicePoint's announcement
many other companies have followed ChoicePoint's lead, establishing disclosure as the
"best-practice" of the industry. Id. Corporate, educational, and government
organizations have announced breaches that exposed over fifty-two million accounts to
fraud between February of 2005 and the end of that year. Id.
Some of the more notable data breaches were announced by Bank of America, MCI,
and LexisNexis. Id. MasterCard International announced the largest exposure of the
year in June of 2005. Robert Bemer & Adrienne Carter, Swiping Back at Credit-Card
Fraud; Bogus transactions are falling overall, but e-tailers are still feeling the pain,
BUSINESS WEEK, July 11, 2005, at 72. One of the companies that processed transactions
for MasterCard suffered a security breach that exposed more than forty million accounts
to fraud. Id.
31. See Identity Theft Surveys and Studies: How Many Identity Theft Victims Are
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cases of identity theft than traditional robberies.32  While the low
conviction rate of identity theft can be blamed on the technology that is
being used to track and trace security breaches and cyber attacks, the
high occurrence rate cannot.33 Identity theft can be partially blamed on
corporations engaging in data sensitive transactions without maintaining
adequate security programs.34
A. How Theft of Personal Data Occurs
There are two main types of identity theft: "account takeover" and
"application fraud., 35 "Account takeover" occurs when existing account
information is stolen.36 All that is needed to make a fraudulent purchase
is a credit card, or a credit card number and an expiration date.37
Application fraud is even easier to commit and more difficult to
discover.38  A thief can commit application fraud with as little
information as a social security number and name. 39 There are several
methods used by thieves to obtain personal information. 40 Thieves have
bought information from employees, stolen it from trucks, stolen
hardware containing information, and taken advantage of corporations'
failures to adequately secure data.41
1. "Low-tech" Identity Theft: Old Fashioned Theft
While "high-tech" or electronic methods of identity theft have
recently dominated the news and pose a serious future threat, the
majority of identity theft in the United States still occurs through "low-
There? (2005), http:www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheftsurveys.htm [hereinafter Identity
Theft Surveys and Studies] (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) (noting that 27.3 million Americans
have been victims of identity theft over the last five years).
32. See WESTBY, supra note 23, at vii.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Reducing the Risk of Identity Theft (2005),




38. See id. Account takeover is easier to discover, because false charges show up on
a monthly account statement. Id. On the other hand, when application fraud occurs, the
monthly statements are sent to the impostor who assumed the victim's identity when he
or she created the account. Therefore, victims might not learn of application fraud for
some time. Id.
39. See Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the
Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 661, 668 (1999) (discussing a simple method by which a thief could obtain a
new account).
40. See generally Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
41. Id.
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tech" methods.42 Lost or stolen wallets account for over one-fourth of
lost identity cases.43  Thieves commonly obtain personal information
through "dumpster-diving;" less artfully known as rooting through trash
bins to find documents containing personal information.44 Friends and
relatives who have access to personal information often take advantage
of the trust bestowed upon them.4 5 Thieves find information through
public records, or might pose as an employer or landlord to obtain
information that cannot be found in public records.4 6 Thieves use these
and other methods47 to obtain personal information; in many situations,
however, technology now provides the ability to obtain similar results
faster and in larger volumes.
48
2. "High-tech" Identity Theft: Electronic Dumpster Diving
Thieves use technology to directly steal personal information
through keylogging,49 spyware,5 ° and phishing.5 ' Among these methods,
phishing has recently become the most common.52 Phishing involves
sending consumers email that is designed to look like it is from a
53legitimate company. Thieves simply ask the consumer to update or
verify their information and up to five percent of the recipients comply.
54
When the fraudulent email is sent to a consumer who is concerned about
identity theft, but perhaps not educated about how it occurs, the
suggestion that a company they trust needs to verify personal information
seems reasonable. 55 The consumer responds under the belief that they
42. See 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Reducing the Risk, supra note 35.
45. 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 7.
46. Reducing the Risk, supra note 35.
47. Other common methods employed by thieves to steal people's identity include
stealing mail, accessing the information as part of a legitimate transaction, obtaining
personal identification numbers by "shoulder surfing" at ATMs, and stealing files from
the workplace. See generally 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 7;
Reducing the Risk, supra note 35.
48. See Levy & Stone, supra note 1 (stating that criminals are now able to grab
information in large quantities instead of obtaining it victim-by-victim).
49. Keylogging involves a computer program, installed without the user's
knowledge, that records all the keystrokes made by the user. 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD
SURVEY, supra note 2, at 6.
50. Spyware is often installed without the user's knowledge. Once installed, it
captures the activities of the user, such as the websites visited, passwords entered, and
other personal information. The spyware then sends this information to a website where
it is collected by a third party. POST & ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 173.
51. 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 6.
52. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
53. Id.
54. Identity Theft Surveys and Studies, supra note 31.
55. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
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are helping to protect themselves from becoming a victim of fraud.
5 6
Unfortunately phishing websites are hard to shut down because they
usually are hosted overseas and the thieves that run them keep them
online for an average of only 2.25 days.57
Thieves also use technology to sell stolen information and to use
stolen credit card numbers to make fraudulent purchases. 58 Thieves sell
stolen records using chat rooms and, in some cases, advertise the stolen
information on websites. 59 Since Internet purchases are Cardholder-Not-
60*frat
Present ("CNP") transactions, it is easy for a thief to use stolen credit
card numbers along with personal information to make fraudulent
Internet purchases. 61 Technology helps crooks avoid detection as well.
Thieves sell items that they do not own in online auctions, then they use
stolen credit card information to purchase the items from a legitimate
retailer when the auction closes.62 The legitimate retailer then ships the
items to the auction winner, allowing the thieves to collect the auction
price without exposing themselves to detection.6 3
The method of electronic theft most dangerous to consumers is a
direct attack on corporate databases.64 Unlike phishing, keylogging, and
the "low-tech" methods of obtaining information discussed above, a
single direct database attack can affect millions of consumers.6 5
Consumers who take measures to protect their data or who do not use
online transactions may not need to be as concerned about other methods
of fraud as consumers who are careless or uneducated about identity
theft. However, a direct database attack affects all consumers equally
since most organizations consolidate all of their data regardless of how
the information was collected.66
56. Id.
57. Identity Theft Surveys and Studies, supra note 31.
58. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
59. Id.
60. CNP transactions, as opposed to cardholder-present transactions, take place
remotely and neither the cardholder nor the card is present at the point-of-sale. The seller
is unable to check the card and the identity of the cardholder because these transactions
occur remotely. The relative ease of CNP fraud compared to cardholder-present fraud,
combined with the reality that more transactions are being performed as CNP transactions
has led to a rise in CNP fraud. Paul Meadowcroft, Combating Cardholder not Present
Fraud, IT OBSERVER, October 17, 2005, http://www.ebcbg.com/articles.php?id=940.
61. Id.
62. Berner & Carter, supra note 30, at 72.
63. Id.
64. Criminals use automated software called "bots" to probe the Internet for
vulnerable databases. Most often, criminals are able to enter a database through a
security flaw that could have been prevented. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
65. Id.
66. See 2005 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 6.
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B. Protecting Electronic Data
To effectively protect electronic data, both privacy and security
issues must be considered.6 7 Security is the foundation of privacy and
prevention of electronic crime. 68 Privacy of electronic information has
been a concern since information management systems took a prominent
role in business processes.69 Without fully exploring the entire realm of
either issue, a brief look at the privacy and security concerns facing
organizations helps one understand the complexity of developing an
effective data security system. The issues privacy and security present to
an organization also foster an understanding that the protection of
electronic data is more than an "IT issue" and instead must be
approached from an "organization-wide" standpoint.
1. Privacy
Personal privacy concerns existed well before the birth of the
Internet. However, the speed at which data can be transmitted using
modern technology 7° and the amount of personal information that can be
stored in electronic databases
71 has magnified these concerns.
72
Corporations not only have to be aware of customers' personal privacy
concerns, they also must consider contractual obligations, legal
requirements, and information unique to their business objectives.73
From a corporate perspective, privacy is a strategic business issue
because information is an important asset. Privacy considerations
determine, in part, what a corporation can do with information assets
without incurring legal liability or harming its image.
Several solutions have been proposed to confront privacy concerns,
including stricter laws, a greater call for self-regulation from the private
sector, and technology-driven solutions.74 Regardless of future attempts
67. See generally JODY R. WESTBY, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO CYBER SECURITY
(2004) [hereinafter WESTBY, SECURITY] (in order for the Internet to prosper individual
users, governments, and businesses must work together to create effective security
programs); JODY R. WESTBY, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY (2004) [hereinafter
WESTBY, PRIVACY] (businesses must consider privacy issues when developing security
programs).
68. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at xxxi.
69. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67.
70. "Communications privacy" is a classification that includes electronic
surveillance, encryption, email, and digital telephony. DUNCAN LANGFORD, INTERNET
ETHICS 71 (2000) [hereinafter LANGFORD].
71. "Information privacy" includes issues associated with personal information
stored in electronic medium. Id.
72. See id. at 72.
73. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 135.
74. LANGFORD, supra note 70, at 83.
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to preserve privacy, companies interested in implementing effective data
security programs should conduct a privacy risk assessment. 5 Certainly
industry best practices provide a starting point for a company when
developing a privacy policy, but privacy laws, regulations, and strategic
decisions dependent on factors unique to individual businesses also must
be considered.76  Some of these factors include the method of
information collection, the physical location of the business and its
customers, the type of information collected, and the industry to which
the company belongs." Only after determining its privacy goals and
requirements can a company determine how to effectively protect its
information.
2. Security
E-business cannot be successful if the public cannot trust a
company's information systems to protect their personal information.
79
While privacy might be seen as a more personal or organization-specific
issue, the interconnectivity of the Internet has made security a global
issue. 8°  The security of cyberspace extends far beyond issues of
individual privacy and the protection of corporate secrets and
encompasses national defense, terrorism, and the national and global
economies. 81 In order to continue to promote trust in information
systems, these broader issues should be considered as companies
approach their individual data security concerns.82
A lack of coordination between privacy goals and information
security systems can be problematic; unfortunately it is common because
many organizations tend to approach privacy and security issues
independently. 83 An effective security program should include policies
and procedures designed to serve the unique needs of the particular
organization in tandem with the organization's privacy concerns.
84
75. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 135.
76. Id. at 138.
77. Id. at 139.
78. Id. at 136.
79. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 154.
80. Id. See also The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace at 1073, 1077 (PLI
Patents, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series Order No. G0-01 8F,
2003) [hereinafter The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace] (threats to cyberspace
have risen in recent years and vulnerabilities must be reduced to protect the United States
since the operations of information systems drives much of the country's critical
infrastructure).
81. See The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 80, at 1077.
82. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 154.
83. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 137.
84. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 188.
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While impressive technology solutions85 are available to secure data,
software, and networks, the needs of the organization have to drive the
implementation of security mechanisms in order for a security program
to be successful and cost effective. 6 Rapid changes in technology and
business requirements call for organizations to make security an integral
part of their planning and operations.87
Although security of information systems and electronic data is
accomplished by the implementation of technology solutions, security
88should be viewed as an enterprise-wide issue. Many security programs
are managed from an IT perspective; this approach can ignore the
managerial, operational, and legal issues that should be considered in
order to provide effective security.89 An enterprise-wide approach to
security effectively accounts for legal, regulatory, and contractual
obligations, as well as best practices, in a way that an IT-only approach
cannot. 90 The need for effective privacy planning and security policies is
more important to private organizations today than ever before. 9' The
importance of electronic data and the ability to transfer data using
92computer systems has become essential to our economy. Concern
about the protection of electronic resources will only continue to grow as
both the public 93 and private sectors work together to protect electronic
85. Secure technology used for authorization includes password protection,
biometric identifiers, and smartcards. Id. Other methods used to secure data and
networks include firewalls, antivirus software, backup systems and procedures, intrusion
detection systems, filtering systems to keep employees from exporting sensitive data,
several methods of encryption technology, unique authentication requirements, and
digital signatures. LANGFORD, supra note 70, at 166-73.
86. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 188.
87. See Wendy Tanaka, Blue Bell, Pa.-Based Unisys Will Offer Package of Internet-
Security Services, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 2001, at D03.
88. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 188.
89. WESTBY, supra note 23, at 4.
90. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 188.
91. See The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 80, at 1081.
92. See id.
93. The Internet has been described as a "critical infrastructure" that is as important
to national defense and the economy as roads, bridges, and other components of the
nation's physical infrastructure. See Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons:
Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructures in a Networked
World, BUSINESs LAWYER, November 2002, at 349. However, the Internet was not
created with security in mind. Id. at 351. Transmission Control Protocol / Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP), the communication mechanism upon which the Internet operates, was
designed for usability and availability, not security. Id. at 353. The national economy
has been changed by the use of networked computer systems and the ability to transfer
data using them; however, security was not a concern during the early days of computer
use, leaving many security issues unanswered. See id. at 351. Computer systems open
and close pipelines, control manufacturing processes, operate utility grids, and are vital to
air traffic control. The U.S. banking system electronically moves approximately $3
trillion every day. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 11.
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data and computer networks.
94
III. Current Data Security Requirements: Data Protected By
Legislation
A. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act9 5
The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, better known as the
"Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act" ("GLB Act"), includes provisions to protect
consumer information held by financial institutions.96 Under the GLB
Act, companies that are "significantly engaged" 97 in "financial
activities ' ' 98 are required to give consumers privacy notices which
explain the information sharing practices of the company.99 Customers
also have the right to limit some information sharing by the company.100
Further, any entity that a financial institution shares consumer
information with may be restricted in its use and disclosure of that
information. 101
The GLB Act's Privacy Rule applies to financial institutions that
collect "nonpublic personal information"'10 2 from its "customers" or
94. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 19.
95. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006).
96. FTC Privacy Initiatives, supra note 18.
97. The FTC's "significantly engaged" standard accounts for all of an organization's
financial activities to determine whether the organization is "significantly engaged" in
financial activities; however, two factors carry particular importance in determining
whether the "significantly engaged" standard is met. How to Comply with the Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glblong.pdf at 6 [hereinafter How to
Comply]. The first factor is the existence of a formal agreement. Id. If the organization
has a formal agreement with customers it is more likely to meet the "significantly
engaged" standard. Id. The second factor is the frequency that the organization engages
in the financial activity. Id. If the organization regularly engages in the financial activity
in question, it is likely that the "significantly engaged" standard is met. Id.
98. The activities that an organization engages in determine whether it is a financial
institution. Financial activities include: lending, exchanging, transferring or investing for
others; safeguarding money or securities; providing financial, investment, or economic
advisory services; brokering loans; servicing loans; collecting debts; providing real estate
settlement services; and even providing career counseling for individuals seeking
employment in the financial services industry. Id. The FTC has also interpreted the term
"financial institution" to include law firms. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 19- 20.
99. How to Comply, supra note 97, at 5.
100. In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glbshort.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
101. How to Comply, supra note 97, at 5.
102. "Nonpublic personal information" is financial information
(i) provided by a consumer to a financial institution;
(ii) resulting from any transaction with the consumer or any service performed
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"consumers" and companies that receive "nonpublic personal
information" from financial institutions. 0 3 The frequency and type of
notification requirements that an organization must send depend upon
whether the "nonpublic personal information" in question belongs to a
"customer" or a "consumer." 10 4 The GLB Act defines a "consumer" as
"an individual10 5 who obtains, from a financial institution, financial
products or services which are to be used primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes .... ,,106 "Customers" are "consumers" who have
a continuing relationship with the financial institution.'0 7 Regardless of
whether a financial institution plans to disclose "nonpublic personal
information" it must "[a]t the time of establishing a customer relationship
with a consumer and not less than annually during the continuation of
such relationship ... provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure to [the]
customer.' 0 8  This privacy notice must include the organization's
policies and practices regarding disclosing nonpublic personal
information to affiliates and third parties, disclosing nonpublic personal
information of past customers, and the measures the organization takes to
protect consumers' nonpublic personal information.' 0 9 The GLB Act
requires an organization to provide "consumers" with privacy notices
only if they intend to share nonpublic personal information with third
parties. 1
A financial institution wishing to disclose nonpublic personal
information must provide its "consumers"''' with an opt-out notice.'
12
The opt-out notice must "clearly and conspicuously disclose to the
consumer ... that ... information may be disclosed to a third party'
'13
for the consumer; or
(iii) otherwise obtained by the financial institution
15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (2006). Any information that is publicly available is not
"nonpublic personal information." Id. § 6809(4)(B). All information included in a list
that contains or is derived from "nonpublic personal information" is considered to be
"nonpublic personal information." Id. § 6809(4)(C).
103. How to Comply, supra note 97, at 2.
104. Id. at 3.
105. The Privacy Rule only applies to individuals; therefore, it does not protect
information belonging to commercial consumers. Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(9).
107. How to Comply, supra note 97, at 3.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2006).
109. Id.
110. How to Comply, supra note 97, at 7.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 6809. The opt-out requirement applies equally to "customers" and
"consumers." By definition, "customers" are a subclass of "consumers" and therefore
any requirement applicable to "consumers" also includes "customers". How to Comply,
supra note 97, at 3.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (2006).
113. Id. § 6802(b)(1)(A).
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and give the consumer an explanation of how he or she can exercise the
opt-out choice."l 4 The organization must give the consumer a reasonable
opportunity to exercise the opt-out option before it can disclose any
information." 5  The GLB Act does not require that an organization
provide its consumers with an opt-out choice if it is providing nonpublic
personal information to a third party in order for the third party to
perform services on behalf of the organization. 16  However, the
organization must fully disclose that it is providing the information, and
enter into a contractual agreement with the third party requiring the third
party to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 17
After an organization discloses information to a third party, that
third party can again disclose the information, but only in accordance
with the privacy policy of the original organization. 18 The third party
can still disclose information to its affiliates and to the affiliates of the
original institution if the disclosure could be made by the original
institution. 19 Additionally, the third party can disclose information if it
provides the consumer with an opportunity to opt out and the consumer
does not do so.'
20
In addition to the notice requirements of the Privacy Rule, the GLB
Act also includes the Safeguards Rule. 12 1 The Safeguards Rule requires
financial institutions to design, implement, and maintain safeguards to
secure customer records and information. 22  The Safeguards Rule
applies to an organization's "customer" information and to any
"customer" information provided to the organization by another
company. 23 The Safeguards Rule requires an organization to maintain a
written "information security program ... [that] contains administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards ....,'24  The objectives of the
Safeguards Rule are to provide for the security of customer information,
protect against security and integrity hazards, and protect against
114. Id. § 6802(b)(1)(C).
115. Id. § 6802(b)(1)(B).
116. Id. § 6802(b)(2).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2).
118. Id. § 6802(c).
119. How to Comply, supra note 97, at 13.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2006).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
122. FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(a)
(2006).
123. Id. § 314.1(b).
124. Id. § 314.3(a). These safeguards include designating an employee or employees
to coordinate the information security program and conducting a risk assessment of, at
least, the following: employee training, information systems, and detection and
prevention of attacks and system failures. Id. §§ 314.3(a)-(b).
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unauthorized access to customer data. 25  The Safeguards Rule is
designed to be flexible so as to be equally applicable to organizations of
different sizes.' 26  The information security program "shall ... [be]
appropriate to [the organization's] size and complexity, the nature and
scope of [the organization's] activities, and the sensitivity of any
customer information at issue."'
127
While the GLB Act does provide some protection for consumers, it
still allows for companies to disclose or even sell information. 128 First,
the GLB Act is limited in scope. It only applies to organizations
"significantly engaged" in "financial activities." 29  It only applies to
"nonpublic personal information."'' 30 Annual notice must be given only
to "customers," potentially leaving "consumers" unaware of the privacy
policies of an organization that possess the consumer's information.1
31
An organization is free to disclose information to third parties as long as
it contracts with the third party to maintain the confidentiality of the
information. 32  This means that a consumer who conscientiously
discloses information to his or her financial organization cannot control
the further dissemination of his or her personal information. As it stands,
a consumer's information might be sitting in several databases belonging
to any number of organizations possessing information security policies
unknown to the consumer.'
33
Secondly, the GLB Act's opt-out requirement allows an
organization to disclose almost any information 34 if the consumer fails
to exercise his or her opt-out rights. Often consumers do not exercise
these rights.' 35 Privacy notices are written at a graduate reading level,
136
are long,' and often are used as a marketing ploy by the companies
125. Id. § 314.3(b).
126. Id. § 314.3(a).
127. Id.
128. Eric Poggemiller, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-
Leach-Bliley: Much Ado About Nothing?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 633 (2002).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3) (2006).
130. Id. at § 6801(a).
131. Id. at § 6802(b)(1).
132. Id. at § 6802(b)(2).
133. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2006). The Safeguards Rule provides some comfort in the
area of information security; however, it only requires an organization to develop a
security program that is appropriate to its size and structure. Id.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(d) (2006). Account numbers or similar access numbers or
codes cannot be disclosed for marketing purposes regardless of whether the consumer has
exercised his or her opt-out rights. Id.
135. See Poggemiller, supra note 128, at 628.
136. Id. at 629.
137. See id. at 631 (suggesting that some companies deliberately create long and
confusing notices).
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issuing them.' 38 While it is possible that some consumers are indifferent
to information sharing or feel that information sharing is beneficial, it is
clear that many consumers are unaware of their opt-out rights under the
GLB Act. 139
The Safeguards Rule forces an organization to focus on important
objectives when creating and implementing an information security
plan.1 40  The Safeguards Rule does not provide specific technical
standards that an organization must meet in order to comply, instead it
requires an information security program that is appropriate for the
particular organization.14' While this flexibility does not leave a
company with an item-by-time checklist of what it must do to comply,
the Safeguards Rule does provide minimum considerations for a
company's risk assessment.,42  Most companies also realize that
providing adequate security for customer information makes good
business sense. 4 3 This realization, combined with the requirements of
the Safeguards Rule, provides companies with an incentive to actively
pursue an effective data security program.
B. HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA") 144 authorized the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to issue privacy protections for patients' health care
information.14 5  The goal of HIPAA is to improve "the efficiency and
effectiveness of the health care system by encouraging the development
of a health information system through the establishment of standards
and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health
information."' 146 In order to further this goal and protect "individually
138. Id. at 632.
139. See R. Bradley McMahon, Note: After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and
GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?
49 VILL. L. REV. 625, 641-42 (2004) (suggesting that many consumers do not exercise
their opt-out rights because the process is difficult and cumbersome.)
140. See FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R.
§ 314.3(a).
141. Id.
142. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 30-31.
143. Financial Institutions and Customer Data: Complying with the Safeguards Rule
(2002), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/safeguards.pdf I [hereinafter
Financial Institutions].
144. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 [hereinafter HIPAA] (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
145. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Fact Sheet: Protecting
the Privacy of Patients' Health Information (Apr. 14, 2003) available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/facts/privacy.html.
146. Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 261, 110 Stat. 2021 (1996).
[Vol. 111:3
2007] PROTECTING THE MOST VALUABLE CORPORATE ASSET 795
identifiable health information,"147 HHS issued the Standards for
Electronic Transactions ("Transactions Rule"), 148 the Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information ("HIPAA
Privacy Rule"), 149 and the Security Standards ("HIPAA Security
Rule").150  HIPAA applies to health plans,1 5' health care
clearinghouses, 5 2 and health care providers that transmit health
information in electronic form.
53
The Transactions Rule created standards for electronic transactions
and the data elements 54 included in electronic transactions to facilitate
the electronic exchange of health care information.15 5 The Transactions
Rule requires all covered companies to update their computer systems to
meet the rule. 156 Implementing new uniform standards should improve
the utility of the health care system, reduce administration costs, and
force companies to re-evaluate the security systems currently in use. 
157
The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides standards to assure that
"protected health information" 1 58 is properly protected by "covered
entities." 159  The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires "covered entities" to
provide privacy notices, 6 establish appropriate safeguards,' 6' and
provide staff training. 62 It also requires companies to limit disclosures
by making efforts to use, disclose, and request only the minimum amount
of protected health information needed to fulfill the purpose of the
disclosure. 63 A covered entity can use protected health information only
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6) (2006). "Individually identifiable health information" is
any information that "(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan,
employer, or health care clearinghouse; and (B) relates to the past present or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, and (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify the individual."
Id.
148. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162 (2006).
149. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2006).
150. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2006).
151. Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 1172(a)(1).
152. Id. § 1172(a)(2).
153. Id. § 1172(a)(3).
154. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006). A "data element" is "the smallest named unit of
information in a transaction." Id.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a).
156. See 45 C.F.R. § 163.923(a) (2006).
157. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 40.
158. "Protected health information" is "individually identifiable health information"
that is transmitted or maintained using electronic media. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
159. "Covered entities" are health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers. Id. § 160.103.
160. Id. § 164.520.
161. Seeid. § 164.530(c).
162. Id. § 164.530(b).
163. Id. § 164.502(b).
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as the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits or with written authorization by the
individual who the information is about. 164  However, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule does not restrict the use or disclosure of "de-identified
health information."'
165
The HIPAA Privacy Rule also permits the disclosure and use of
protected health information without an individual's authorization in
some situations where the information is not de-identified.166 A covered
entity can disclose protected health information directly to the
individual. 16 7 Protected health information can be used and disclosed by
a covered entity for its own treatment, payment and health care
operations activities. 168 Information can be disclosed by obtaining the
owner's oral consent or in situations where the individual clearly has the
opportunity to agree or object to the disclosure and does not. 169
Disclosures can also be made where public health protection,170 law
enforcement,171 and worker's compensation determinations1 72 require.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does take several measures to limit the
amount of information that is disclosed to that which is necessary1 73 and
to make sure that consumers are aware of the privacy policies of the
companies with which they are dealing. 74 The rule requires companies
to implement "minimum necessary" policies that limit the employees
who have access to protected information, 175 and limit the amount of
information disclosed to that which is reasonably necessary to carry out
the purpose of the request. 176  Companies also must implement
reasonable technical, administrative, and physical safeguards to maintain
the privacy of protected information.1 77 While these standards do force
organizations to look seriously at their data security systems, they are not
overly burdensome178 because the rule provides exceptions and only
164. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2006).
165. Id. § 164.502(d)(2). Health information that does not identify or provide a
reasonable method for identifying an individual is "de-identified." Id. § 164.514(a).
166. Id. § 164.502(a)(1).
167. See id. § 164.506.
168. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2006).
169. Id. § 164.510.
170. Id. § 164.512(b).
171. Id. § 164.512(f).
172. Id. § 164.512(1).
173. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2006).
174. Id. § 164.520(a)-(b).
175. Id. § 164.514(d)(2).
176. Id. § 164.514(d)(3).
177. Id. § 164.530(c).
178. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text. The Privacy Rule also creates
another exception under which protected information can be disclosed. A disclosure that
is incidental to or occurs as a by-product of another disclosure is permitted as long as the
company has applied reasonable safeguards and the minimum necessary standards. See
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requires a company to "reasonably safeguard" information.
179
Privacy cannot be achieved without appropriate information
security. 80  The HIPAA Security Rule 181 supports the HIPAA Privacy
Rule by providing "standards, implementation specifications, and
requirements ... with respect to electronic protected health
information."1 82  Covered entities must ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of electronically protected health information,
protect against anticipated security and integrity threats, protect against
non-permitted disclosures, and ensure compliance by employees.' 83 To
achieve these goals, a covered entity is permitted to use "any security
measure... [that] reasonably and appropriately implement[s]" these
standards. 84 While this approach is flexible, the rule requires that an
organization consider several factors when it determines what security
measures to implement. 85  Considerations include the entity's size,
complexity, and capabilities; 186 the entity's technical infrastructure,
hardware, and software capabilities; 87 the cost of proposed security
measures; 88 and the probability of potential risks.
89
In addition to these guidelines, the HIPAA Security Rule provides
more detailed requirements related to administrative safeguards,' 90
physical safeguards,' 9' technical safeguards, 92  organizational
requirements, 93  and documentation. 94  These implementation
specifications are divided into two categories: "required" and
"addressable."'' 95  A covered entity must implement "required"
specifications. 96 While "addressable" specifications must be considered
by all covered entities, their implementation is only required in specific
id. § 164.502.
179. See id. § 164.530(c)(2).
180. See WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 19 (privacy of data is directly
dependent upon security).
181. Covered entities were required to be in compliance with the HIPAA Security
Rule by April 20, 2005. 45 C.F.R. § 164.318 (2006).
182. Id. § 164.302.
183. Id. § 164.306(a).
184. Id. § 164.306(b)(1).
185. Id. § 164.306(b)(2).
186. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(i) (2006).
187. Id. § 164.306(b)(2)(ii).
188. Id. § 164.306(b)(2)(iii).
189. Id. § 164.306(b)(2)(iv).
190. Id. § 164.308.
191. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2006).
192. Id. § 164.312.
193. Id. § 164.314.
194. Id. § 164.308.
195. Each implementation specification is labeled either "required" or "addressable"
following the title of each specification. Id. § 164.306(d)(1).
196. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(2) (2006).
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situations. 97 A company must access each "addressable" specification in
the context of its organization and determine if the specification is a
"reasonable and appropriate safeguard."'' 98  Each "addressable"
specification that is applicable to the entity must be implemented if it is
"reasonable and appropriate."' 99  If a company finds that an
"addressable" specification is not "reasonable and appropriate," it must
justify and document its findings and implement a "reasonable and
appropriate" alternative if one exists.2 °0
Obligatory administrative safeguards call for a covered entity to
implement a security management process to "prevent, detect, contain,
and correct security violations., 20  Four "required" implementation
specifications address this goal: a risk analysis assessment, a risk
management program, a policy to sanction employees who do not
comply with the company's security policies, and a regular review of
information system activity. 2 2  A covered entity must assign
responsibility for security to a security official.0 3 The implementation of
policies and procedures to make sure that employees have appropriate
access to protected information is dealt with through "addressable"
specifications.0 4  Covered entities should implement an employee
security awareness and training program20 5 and procedures to deal with
security incidents.20 6 The administrative safeguards also call for a
contingency plan that allows the company to recover its systems without
damage to data in the event of a natural disaster or system failure. 20 7 The
changing technical environment is addressed as well; a covered entity
must perform "periodic technical and nontechincal evaluation[s]. 2 °8
The physical safeguards of the HIPAA Security rule address the
physical machines used to process and store data, as well as the buildings
in which these machines reside. 20 9 A covered entity must implement
197. See id. § 164.306(d)(3).
198. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(i).
199. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(A).
200. Id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i) (2006).
202. Id. §§ 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)-(D). Records containing information system activity
includes "audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking reports." Id.
§ 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D).
203. Id. § 164.308(a)(2).
204. Id. § 164.308(a)(3)(ii).
205. Id. § 164.308(a)(5)(i). "Addressable" implementation specifications that
advance the goal of an effective employee training and awareness program are security
reminders and updates, procedures for guarding against malicious software, monitoring
system log-ins, and password management procedures. Id. §§ 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A)-(D).
206. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(6)(i) (2006).
207. See id. §§ 164.308(a)(7)(i)-(ii).
208. Id. § 164.308(a)(8).
209. Seeid. § 164.310.
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policies and procedures to limit access to systems containing protected
information. 210  "Addressable" implementation specifications include
creating procedures to control access to facilities, control access to
software, and safeguard a company's physical machines. 21  Finally,
policies and procedures must be developed to deal with the movement,
re-use, and disposition of any physical hardware containing protected
information.21 2
The technical safeguards of the HIPAA Security Rule address
213access to electronic data and the transmission of protected data. A
covered entity has to implement policies to restrict access to protected
health information by individuals and software programs. 2,4  These
policies must include unique user identification for the purpose of
tracking users, 2 5 a method for accessing information during an
emergency, automatic system logoff, and mechanisms to encrypt
protected information.21 6 The technology safeguards also provide for
security measures during the transmission of data over an electronic
network.21 7  Two "addressable" implementation standards call for
companies to ensure data integrity and to encrypt protected information
in appropriate circumstances.1 8
The HIPAA Security Rule holds an organization responsible for the
actions of its business associates by requiring that any contract with a
business associate include provisions that require the business associate
to protect any private health information obtained from the covered
entity. 2 9 The HIPAA Security Rule's documentation requirements help
make sure that the organization considers and attends to the requirements
of the rule. 220 A written record of the actions, activities, and assessments
210. Seeid. § 164.310(a).
211. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(2) (2006).
212. Id. §§ 164.310(d)(l)-(2). An "addressable" implementation specification also
requires that all electronically protected health information is backed-up before any
physical equipment is moved. Id. § 164.3 10(d)(2)(iv).
213. See id. § 164.312.
214. Id. § 164.312(a)(1).
215. See id. § 164.312(b). Unique user ID's allow the implementation of audit
controls for the purpose of recording activity in information systems that contain
protected data. Id. Procedures to verify that a person seeking access to protected data is
authorized help ensure that the audit controls are accurate. See id. § 164.312(c).
216. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) (2006).
217. Id. § 164.312(e)(1).
218. Id. § 164.312(e)(2).
219. See id. § 164.314.
220. See id. §§ 164.316(b)(2)(ii) (requiring that documentation be made available for
individuals responsible for implementing necessary procedures) and 164.316(b)(2)(iii)
(requiring that documentation be reviewed and updated as "environmental or operational
changes affecting the security of electronic protected health information" demand).
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221required by the rule must be retained by an organization for six years.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule and HIPAA Security Rule provide
detailed requirements, while acknowledging that flexibility is necessary
based on each organization's size, function, and unique characteristics.
222
When an organization does disclose protected health information it must
use reasonable efforts to disclose only the minimum amount of
information necessary under the circumstances.223 The HIPAA Security
Rule offers protection for electronic health information by providing
implementation specifications that must be put in place.224 HIPAA's
requirements are given weight through a number of criminal and civil
penalties. 225 Some argue that the specific requirements of the HIPAA
Security Rule combined with the potential for criminal penalties might
be too much too soon. 6 The cost of compliance may have an impact on
covered organizations, adversely affecting the quality of health care. 27
While the Security Rules are extensive, they do allow a covered entity
the flexibility to implement their requirements in a manner that is
appropriate to the individual organization.225
C. Federal Information Security Management Act ("FISMA ")
The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
("FISMA") provides the framework for the information security229 of
221. 45 C.F.R. § 164.316(b)(2)(i).
222. See id. §§ 160, 162, 164.
223. Id. § 164.502(b).
224. Id. § 164.302. See also id. §§ 164.306, 164.308, 164.310, and 164.312.
225. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1176-77 (2006).
226. WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 44 (arguing that the HIPAA Security Rules
cause confusion and suggesting that government regulators need to better understand
cyber security before enacting regulations of this type).
227. See id. at 46.
228. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(b)(2) (2006) (allowing the following factors to
be considered in determining which security measures to use: size, complexity, and
capabilities of the covered entity, technical infrastructure, including hardware and
software capabilities, cost, the probability of potential risks); 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)
("addressable implementation specifications only need to be implemented if "reasonable
and appropriate"); 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (a mechanism must be implemented "to encrypt
electronic protected health information whenever deemed appropriate") (emphasis
added).
229. FISMA comprehensively defines "information security:"
The term "Information security" means protecting information and information
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction in order to provide-
(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper information
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information
nonrepudiation and authenticity;
(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and
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federal information systems.230  The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget ("Director")231 oversees information security
policies for all agencies.232 The Director must require federal agencies to
identify and provide information security that is appropriate for the "risk
and magnitude of harm [that would result] from the unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of' information
gathered by the agency and information systems used by the agency.23 3
The Director also must review the agencies' information security
programs at least annually.234 While the Director is responsible for
coordinating the information security policies of all federal agencies,235
each agency is responsible for implementing an information security
policy that best fits its own needs. 6
Each agency must conduct a risk assessment, 237 determine the level
of security necessary to protect its information and information
systems,238 implement cost-effective methods to reduce these risks,239
and periodically test its systems to make sure the methods are
effective. 240  FISMA authorizes the designation of a senior agency
information security officer. 241 This officer has to "possess professional
qualifications" and has one primary duty: information security.
242
Compliance with FISMA is monitored in several ways. First, each
agency is required to perform an independent evaluation of its security
program.243 The evaluation must test the effectiveness of the agency's
policies and procedures and assess the agency's compliance with
FISMA.244 Each agency is required to report the results of its evaluation
to the Director.24 5
FISMA seems to offer strong tools that encourage agencies to
proprietary information ; and
(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and
use of information.
44 U.S.C. § 3542(b)(1).
230. See id. § 3541.
231. Id. § 3502(4).
232. Id. § 3543(a).
233. Id. § 3543(a)(2).
234. 44 U.S.C. § 3543(a)(5).
235. Id. § 3543(a)(6).
236. See id. § 3544.
237. Id. § 3544(a)(2)(A).
238. Id. § 3544(a)(2)(B).
239. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(2)(C).
240. Id. § 3544(a)(2)(D).
241. Id. § 3544(a)(3).
242. Id. §§ 3544(a)(3)(A)(ii)-(iii).
243. Id. § 3545(a)(1).
244. 44 U.S.C. § 3545(a)(2)(A)-(B).
245. Id. § 3545(e)(1).
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implement successful security procedures. 246  Agencies are held
accountable by the evaluation and reporting requirements.24 7
Unfortunately, the most recent results of these evaluations reveal
248weaknesses. An assessment of how well agencies met the
requirements of FISMA left the federal government with an overall grade
of "D+" and seven agencies2 49 with failing scores for their data security
efforts.250 While the government's overall grade was an improvement
over the previous year's "D," other evidence suggests that federal
agencies are failing in their efforts to comply with FISMA.25 1
IV. Data Not Currently Protected by Specific Legislation: The FTC
Cracks Down on "Deceptive Trade Practices"
A. FTC Consent Decrees
Even before the recent media coverage of identity theft, the FTC
used its authority to prevent unfair or deceptive trade practices under the
FTC Act 252 to make sure that companies kept the data security promises
253
they made to consumers. The FTC has filed complaints against
several companies that failed to take precautions to secure their
customers' information as promised in their online privacy policies.254
The FTC has also used its power to prevent unfair practices to challenge
246. See, e.g., id. § 3544(a)(3) (calling for the appointment of a senior agency
information security officer).
247. See, e.g., id. § 3545(a)(1) (requiring independent evaluation of each agency's
security program); 44 U.S.C. § 3545(e)(1) (requiring yearly reporting of evaluations to
the Director).
248. See Nikki Swartz, Cybersecurity Report Reveals Weaknesses. 39 INFO. MGMT. J.
19, 19 (2005) [hereinafter Cybersecurity Report] (at least half of all U.S. federal agencies
received a grade of "D" or worse on the House Government Reform Committee's annual
report).
249. The departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human
Services, Housing and Urban Development, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs all
received failing grades for the year 2004. The departments of Defense and Treasury, as
well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Small Business
Administration were not far behind, each receiving a grade of"D." Id.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., id. (while ten agencies improved their grades from 2003, eight others
received lower marks than they did in 2003); Joanie Wexler, Federal agencies need to
improve Wi-Fi controls; *NIST to develop updated wireless guidelines, NETWORK
WORLD, July 6, 2005 (suggesting few agencies have implemented appropriate security
measures).
252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
253. FTC Privacy Initiatives, supra note 18.
254. E.g., In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123 (July 30, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/ os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf.
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information security practices that cause consumer injury.255 The FTC
has entered consent agreements with many of the companies it has filed
complaints against (collectively "FTC Consent Orders"). 5 6  These
agreements outline a consistent standard that offending companies must
meet and offer guidance about what must be done to avoid liability for
failing to protect consumer data. 7
1. BJ's Wholesale Club
The FTC alleged that BJ's Wholesale Club ("BJ's") did not employ
reasonable standards to secure data collected from customers at its stores
from at least November 1, 2003 until February, 2004.258 Subsequently,
BJ's entered into a consent order with the FTC ("BJ's Order") to resolve
these allegations. 259 According to the FTC, BJ's (1) did not encrypt
information while in transit or while stored on in-store computer
networks, (2) stored information in files that could be accessed using a
known default user ID and password, (3) did not use available security
measures to secure wireless access points on its networks, (4) did not
conduct security investigations, and (5) put data at risk by storing it for
up to thirty days after it had a business need to keep the information.
260
BJ's used computer networks to obtain authorization for credit card
and debit card purchases. 26 1 In order to authenticate a customer's card,
BJ's collected personal information 262 from the magnetic strip. on the
255. See, e.g., id.
256. Id.; In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 (May 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm; In re BJ's Wholesale Club,
Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305do0423160.pdf.
257. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 (May 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm.
258. Complaint at 3, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS
134 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp
0423160.pdf.
259. In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134.
260. Complaint at 2, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134.
261. Id.
262. "Personal information" was defined in the BJ's Order to include but not be
limited to
(a) first and last name; (b) a home or other physical address, including street
name and name of city or town; (c) an email address or other online contact
information, such as an instant messaging user identification or a screen name
that reveals an individual's email address; (d) a telephone number; (e) a Social
Security number; (f) credit and/or debit card information, including credit
and/or debit card number, expiration date, and data stored on the magnetic
stripe of a credit or debit card; (g) a persistent identifier, such as a customer
number held in a "cookie" or processor serial number, that is combined with
other available data that identifies an individual consumer; or (h) any other
information from or about an individual consumer that is combined with (a)
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
customer's credit or debit card.2 63 After the information from the card's
magnetic strip was collected, it was used to form an authorization
request.26' That request was transmitted from the in-store network to
BJ's central datacenter.265 From there, outside networks transferred the
request to the card's issuing bank.2 66 The issuing bank then granted or
denied the request through the same networks.267 BJ's also used wireless
scanners to manage inventory.268 The FTC alleged that a hacker could
use the wireless access points connecting the scanners to the network to
access BJ's network and steal personal information.269
Several customers who used their cards at BJ's stores discovered
that fraudulent purchases were made using copies of the information on
their cards. 270 The FTC alleged that information that was stored on BJ's
network was stolen and used to make counterfeit cards. 271 The customers
and their banks had to cancel and reissue thousands of credit cards.27 2
During this process, several customers were unable to access their bank
accounts.273
The BJ's Order274 required BJ's to "implement and ... maintain, a
comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed
to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal
information collected from or about consumers. 275 At a minimum, BJ's
information security program must include a designated program
coordinator, a risk assessment, and the implementation of reasonable
safeguards based on the risk assessment.276 The risk assessment should
consider, at a minimum, employee training and management, network
and software design, information processing, data storage, data
and (g) above.
In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *2-3.
263. Complaint at 3, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134 (Sept.
20, 2005).









273. In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134 at *2.
274. The terms of the agreement provide that BJ's entered it for "settlement purposes
only" and the agreement does not serve as an admission to anything contained in the
FTC's complaint. In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134,
at *1 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305do
0423160.pdf.
275. Id. at *4.
276. Id. at *4-5.
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transmission, and procedures to prevent, detect, and respond to attacks.277
Furthermore, BJ's has to provide a third-party278 assessment and report to
the FTC biennially for twenty years. 279  The third-party report must
describe what safeguards BJ's set forth, why they are appropriate based
on characteristics 28° unique to BJ's business, and how they meet or
exceed the protections required by the BJ's Order.28' The terms of the
BJ's Order, issued on May 17, 2005, do not terminate for twenty years.
282
2. Eli Lilly
In 2002, the FTC entered a consent agreement ("Eli Lilly Order")
with Eli Lilly and Company ("Eli Lilly"), a pharmaceutical company.283
The FTC alleged that Eli Lilly misrepresented the protection it offered
for consumers' personally identifiable information.284 Eli Lilly promoted
Prozac through two company websites. 285  As part of the Prozac
marketing campaign, Eli Lilly offered a service called "Medi-
messenger.', 286 This reminder service allowed consumers to design and
receive personal email reminders about their medication from Eli
Lilly.287 In order to use this service, a consumer simply had to register
for .it by providing an email address, a password, and a schedule of the
dates he or she wished to receive reminders.288
After the consumer provided the required information, he or she had
the option to view the web site's "Privacy Statement" by clicking a
hyperlink. 289  The "Privacy Statement" contained several provisions
either expressly stating or implying that Eli Lilly employed appropriate
277. Id. at *5.
278. The third party must be qualified as a Certified Information System Security
Professional (CISSP) or as a Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA); hold a
Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) from the SysAdmin, Audit, Network,
Security (SANS) Institute; or be otherwise qualified and approved by the FTC. Id. at *6-
7.
279. In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134 at *5-6.
280. The safeguards must be appropriate in light of BJ's size and complexity, the
nature and scope of BJ's activities, and the sensitivity of the information it collects. Id. at
*4.
281. Id. at *6.
282. Id. at *10. The order will be extended if the FTC files a complaint alleging a
violation of the order in federal court. Id.
283. In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 (May 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm.
284. Complaint at *1, In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 (May
8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *2.
288. In re Eli Lilly & Co., 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 at *2.
289. Id.
2007]
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steps to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal information
290obtained from consumers. On June 27, 2001, Eli Lilly decided to
discontinue the "Medi-messenger" service.29' An Eli Lilly employee
created a computer program to access the email addresses of the "Medi-
messenger" participants and alert them of the service's
292discontinuation. The new computer program generated an email and
sent it to all of the "Medi-messenger" subscribers.293 The email included
all the recipients' email addresses in the "To:" line.294 The FTC alleged
that Eli Lilly could have prevented the disclosure of these 669 "Medi-
messenger" users' personal information if it had implemented and
maintained "internal measures appropriate under the circumstances. 295
While the FTC's complaint suggests that Eli Lilly's failure to take
"appropriate" measures was contrary to its "Privacy Statement," it is
unclear whether Eli Lilly's failure to maintain "appropriate security"
measures would have generated FTC action in the absence of the
representations made in the "Privacy Statement., 296 It is clear that the
Eli Lilly Order addresses Eli Lilly's future actions in both areas. Eli
Lilly "shall not misrepresent ... expressly or by implication, the extent
to which it maintains and protects the privacy or confidentiality of any
personally identifiable information collected from or about
consumers .... "297 The Eli Lilly Order also required Eli Lilly to
establish and maintain an information security program.298 This program
had to include a designated employee to oversee it, a risk management
assessment, and an annual written review.299  The Eli Lilly Order
290. Id. at *2-4. The "Privacy Statement included the following statements: "Eli
Lilly ... respects the privacy of visitors to its Web sites, and we feel it is important to
maintain our guests' privacy as they take advantage of this resource" and "[Our] security
measures help us to honor your choices for the use of Your Information." Id.
291. Id. at *5.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. In re Eli Lilly & Co., 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 at *5.
295. Id. at *5-6. The FTC alleged that Eli Lilly did not provide training for its
employees about consumer privacy and information safety, and did not provide
appropriate training and supervision for the employee who sent the email. Id. The
employee was inexperienced with the computer program that was used. Id. Additionally,
the FTC alleged that Eli Lilly failed to use appropriate testing and control processes
before allowing the email to be sent. See id.
296. See id. at *6-7 (stating the failure to maintain appropriate standards and the
violation of Eli Lilly's own policies as separate counts). See also In re Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22, at *10-11 (May 8, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm (corrective action includes both the proper
representation of Eli Lilly's privacy policies and the implementation of appropriate
security policies).
297. In re Eli Lilly & Company, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22, at *10-11.
298. Id. at * 11.
299. Id.at*10-11.
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required the risk management assessment to address three areas:
management and training of personnel, physical systems and media, and
attack and intrusion prevention.3 °°
While the disclosure of a few hundred email addresses may not
have had the same financial impact as larger data breaches, the Eli Lilly
"Medi-messenger" mistake illustrates the need for a comprehensive
information security policy. It is likely that this disclosure could have
been prevented if Eli Lilly had exercised proper training, program
testing, and management. 30' More importantly, it raises a question
regarding the origin of a company's obligations when it comes to
security. Are a company's obligations self-imposed like Eli Lilly's
"Privacy Statement, 302 based on external ideas of "adequacy,, 30 3 or a
combination of both?
3. Guess?.
The FTC entered into a consent agreement ("Guess Order") with
Guess?, Inc. and Guess.com, Inc. ("Guess") in 2003.304 Guess designs
and sells clothing. In addition to selling products in its own stores and
through independent retailers, Guess also sells clothing through its
website. 30 5 Like the allegations against Eli Lilly, the allegations against
Guess included both misrepresentations of Guess's privacy policy and
failures to use appropriate measures to secure personal information. 3°6 In
order to facilitate online purchases, Guess required consumers to provide
their credit card numbers and other personal information.37
The FTC alleged that Guess stored the information it collected in
300. Id.at*10.
301. See Complaint at *5-6, In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22
(May 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm (program was
written by an inexperienced employee and not tested before being used).
302. See, e.g., In re Gateway Learning Co., No. C-4120, 2004 FTC LEXIS 150 (Sept.
10, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423047/040917comp0423047.pdf
(allegations against Gateway arose when Gateway changed its privacy policy to permit
third-party sharing of personal information without alerting consumers). This was the
first FTC case to challenge deceptive practices in connection with a company making a
change to its privacy policy. See id.
303. See In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *3-5
(Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0423160/092305do0423160.pdf.
304. In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123 (July 30, 2003), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf.
305. Complaint at *1, In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123, (July
30, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guesscomp.pdf.
306. Id. at *6-7 (suggesting failure to use appropriate security measures caused
statements made in privacy policy to be false).
307. Id. at *2.
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database tables. 30 8 Customers used a web application 30 9 to connect to
these tables. 310  The application was designed to retrieve information
from the database tables and present it on a webpage in clear, readable
text.31 1  According to the FTC's complaint, Guess also provided a
privacy policy on its website. 312  It promised that "all . . . personal
information... [is] stored in an unreadable encrypted format at all
times" and "all user information is further protected by a multi-layer
firewall based security system.,
313
According to the FTC, Guess's systems were not as secure as the
privacy agreement indicated and were susceptible to "commonly
known... attacks., 314  The FTC alleged that Guess's databases were
vulnerable to attacks such as SQL315 injection attacks.316 A hacker using
an SQL injection attack enters code in the address bar of a web browser
to direct the application to obtain, alter, or delete information stored in
the database.317 The FTC alleged that in February, 2002, someone used
an SQL injection attack to read and delete credit card information in one
of Guess's databases.3'8
The Guess Order, like the Eli Lilly Order, addressed both Guess's
failure to use appropriate security measures and misrepresentations in
Guess's privacy policy. 3 19 Like the Eli Lilly Order, the Guess Order
required that Guess establish and maintain a written security program
designed to "protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of
personal information collected from or about consumers." 320  The
security program must contain administrative, technical and physical
safeguards 321 appropriate to Guess's size and business activities. 322 In
308. Id.
309. A web application is a software program that is executed by a web server to
respond to a request sent from the browser. GREG RICCARDI, DATABASE MANAGEMENT
WITH WEB SITE DEVELOPMENT APPLICATION 3 (2003).
310. Complaint at *2-3, In re Guess?, Inc., 2003 FTC LEXIS 123.
311. Id. at*3.
312. Id. at *34.
313. Id. at *3.
314. Id. at *5.
315. SQL or "Structured Query Language" is a standard language for defining the
structure of relational databases and manipulating their contents. RICCARDI, supra note
309, at 16.
316. Complaint at *5, In re Guess?, Inc., 2003 FTC LEXIS 123.
317. Id.
318. Id. at*6.
319. In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123, at *11-12 (July 30,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf.
320. Id. at*12.
321. Id. at *12-13. Like the Eli Lilly Order, the Guess Order requires these
safeguards, at minimum, to include: a designated coordinator of the information security
program, a risk assessment, testing and design of safeguards based on the results of the
risk assessment, and evaluation and retesting when changes occur to Guess's business.
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addition to requiring the development of a security program, the Guess
Order also prohibits Guess from making misrepresentations about how it
maintains and protects its customers' privacy. 323 Like the BJ's Order, the
Guess Order requires third-party investigations every two years and
terminates twenty years from the date it was issued.32 4
B. How the FTC's "Crackdown" Stacks Up: What a Corporation Can
Learn from the FTC Consent Orders
The FTC Consent Orders make it clear that a company must deliver
on the promises it makes to consumers about the way it will protect their
personal information.325 However, the BJ's Order also suggests that even
a company that does not make any explicit promises to consumers must
maintain adequate security appropriate to its business. 326 While the FTC
Consent Orders extend twenty years from the date they are entered, they
do acknowledge that security concerns relating to technology are
dynamic and business-specific. 327 Hopefully the flexible language of the
FTC Consent Orders will allow them to provide effective protection
during their long enforcement period even as technology changes. Even
though FTC Consent Orders apply to individual companies, they
illustrate three areas of concern for any company dealing with personal
consumer data.
First, a company dealing with personal information must take its
privacy policy seriously.32 8 While the BJ's Order was based solely on
BJ's failure to implement effective security measures, the other FTC
Consent Orders were, at least partially, based on misrepresentations in




324. In re Guess?, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123, at *13, *18-19. See also In re BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *5-7, *10 (Sept. 20, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305do0423160.pdf; In re Guess?,
Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123, (July 30, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf
325. See, e.g., In re Guess?, Inc., 2003 FTC LEXIS 123.
326. See In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134.
327. See, e.g., id. (stating that the required information security program must contain
safeguards "appropriate to [BJ's] size and complexity, the nature and scope of [BJ's]
activities, and the sensitivity of the personal information..." and "evaluation and
adjustment of [BJ's] security program is required based on periodic risk assessments,
changes in BJ's business or other circumstances that [BJ's] knows or has reason to know
may have a material impact on the effectiveness of its information security program").
328. See, e.g., In re Guess?, Inc., 2003 FTC LEXIS 123, at * 11 ("[the company] shall
not misrepresent ... the extent to which [it] maintain[s] and protect[s] security,
confidentially, or integrity of any personal information").
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failures. 329 A company should write an effective privacy policy, make
sure that it takes the measures the policy claims, and avoid making
material changes to the privacy policy without alerting consumers. 330 On
the other hand, a company should not water down its privacy policy in an
attempt to avoid liability. The FTC has also used its power to prevent
unfair trade practices to take action against companies that fail to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure data in cases not
involving promises in a privacy policy.33 1 However, it is very clear that
the FTC will hold companies liable for failing to deliver on promises
made to consumers in their privacy policies.332 Therefore, a company
should carefully consider whether it can deliver on a promise before
including it in its privacy policy.
Second, a company dealing with personal information should create
a written, comprehensive, company-wide security program.333 The
security plan should be a strategic document, created at an organizational
level, that includes considerations unique to each individual business.
334
The plan should be designed to protect the confidentiality, security, and
integrity of personal data.335 Technical, administrative, and physical
safeguards should be identified and implemented as part of a security
plan.336 While the consequences of ineffective security demand that a
company design its security plan from a company-wide perspective, an
individual employee should be appointed and empowered to coordinate
the plan.337 At a minimum, the safeguards that are implemented as part
of a company's security plan should address employee training,
employee management, network and software design, data storage and
transmission, and intrusion prevention, detection, and response.338
Third, a company that collects or uses its customers' personal
information should evaluate its information security policies frequently,
329. E.g., In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4047, 2002 FTC LEXIS 22 (May 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm.
330. See Complaint at *5-8, In re Gateway Learning Co., No. C-4120, 2004 FTC
LEXIS 150 (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0423047/040917comp0423047.pdf (suggesting allegations arose of out changes made to
Gateway's privacy policy allowing the company to share information when the policy
previously promised that data would not be shared with outside sources).
331. See, e.g., In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134
(Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp
0423160.pdf.
332. E.g., In re Eli Lilly & Co., 2002 FTC LEXIS 22.
333. E.g., In re MITS, Inc., C-4110, 2004 FTC LEXIS 88, at *11-12 (May 28, 2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423047/040917do0423047.pdf.
334. See WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 187.
335. E.g., In re MTS, Inc., 2004 FTC LEXIS 88, at *12.
336. See, e.g., id.
337. See, e.g., id.
338. See, e.g., id. at *12-13.
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using both internal and external auditing methods. 339 At a minimum, a
company should reevaluate its security plan when it makes a change to
its operations or business processes. 340 As Howard Beales, the Director
of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection said, "change is inevitable
[but] ... [c]ompanies must ... make sure ... changes do not create new
vulnerabilities. ''341 How often a company should conduct external audits
is a question unique to a company's individual business needs.
However, any company dealing with its customers' personal information
should obtain an outside audit conducted by a qualified 342 person at least
every two years.343 Frequent audits not only can save a company the
embarrassment and expense associated with a security incident, but also
assure that appropriate industry best practices are being used.34
While the FTC Consent Orders provide some guidance for a
company that collects its consumers' personal information, some have
argued that more should be required. Some argue that a company, which
must collect personal information, should collect only the minimum
information needed to complete a transaction. 345  The FTC Consent
Orders do not prohibit the offending companies from collecting
unnecessary data.346  While the requirement of external audits is
generally praised, some argue that two years between audits is too
long.347 Finally, none of the FTC Orders imposed monetary penalties on
339. See, e.g., In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at
*5-6 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305do
0423160.pdf.
340. E.g,, id. at 5.
341. Press Release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Tower Records Settles FTC Charges
(Apr. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Tower] available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/04/
towerrecords.htm. Mr. Beales went on to compare changes in technical infrastructure to
changes in physical infrastructure, saying "Just as [someone who] remodel[ed] their
home[] would make sure that the doors still ha[d] locks, companies should make sure that
sensitive data is still protected [after a change is made in the company's technical
infrastructure]." Id.
342. The third party should be qualified as a Certified Information System Security
Professional (CISSP) or as a Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA); hold a
Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) from the SysAdmin, Audit, Network,
Security (SANS) Institute; or be otherwise qualified. See, e.g., In re BJ's Wholesale
Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *6-7.
343. See, e.g., id. at *5-6 (requiring BJ's to obtain an independent report every two
years).
344. See, e.g., Bill Hayes, Conducting a Security Audit: An Introductory Overview,
SECURITY Focus, May 26, 2003, http://www.securityfocus.com/print/infocus/1697
(typical information security audit provides measurable ways to correct deficiencies).
345. Letter from Adam Shostack to the FTC (July 5, 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/bjswholesaleclub/050715 shostack.pdf [hereinafter
Shostack Letter] (criticizing the BJ's Order).
346. See, e.g., In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134.
347. Letter from American Community Bankers to the FTC (July 14, 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/bjswholesaleclub/050714amercommunbank.pdf (last
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the offending companies.3 48 If monetary penalties are not imposed, some
question whether companies will aggressively protect consumer
information.349
C. Common Law Tort Liability: BJ's Wholesale Club Revisited
Although the results of electronic fraud and identity theft can be
debilitating for individual consumers, often the bank that issued a stolen
credit card incurs the costs of the fraudulent transaction. 350 As a result of
BJ's failure to properly secure its information systems, its customers'
personal information was stolen. 351 Several of the stolen credit card
numbers belonged to customers of Sovereign Bank ("Sovereign").352
Sovereign sued BJ's to recover the cost of replacing the stolen cards with
new ones and reimbursing cardholders who were victimized.
353
Sovereign participates in a system operated by Visa.354 The Visa
system consists of "issuing members," "acquiring members," and
"merchants. 355  An "issuing member" issues Visa cards to its
356customers. An "acquiring member" enters contracts with "merchants"
and processes card transactions.357 A "merchant" allows cardholders to
pay for goods or services with a Visa card.358 In this case, Sovereign was
an "issuing member," Fifth Third Bank ("Fifth Third") was an "acquiring
member" and BJ's was a "merchant." 359 Fifth Third, as an "acquiring
member," contracted 360 with BJ's to process credit card transactions. In
visited Nov. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Bankers' Letter] (suggesting that an external audit
should be required yearly).
348. See, e.g., In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123 (July 30, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf.
349. See Bankers' Letter, supra note 347. But see FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 143 (business incentives independent from legal obligations motivate the protection
of customer information).
350. Letter from Visa to the FTC (July 18, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
bjswholesaleclub/050718visa.pdf (Institutions that are Visa members do not impose
losses resulting from fraudulent transactions on cardholders.). See also Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006) (relieves cardholders of any obligation in excess of fifty
dollars resulting from the unauthorized use of their card).
351. See supra Part IV.A.1.




355. Id. at 189.
356. Id.
357. Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. BJ's and Fifth Third entered into two merchant agreements. One governed
purchases made with credit cards. The other governed purchases made with debit cards.
Id. Collectively, the two contracts will be referred to as "BJ's merchant contract" for
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order for a business to become a "merchant" of the Visa member
association, it must agree to Visa's operating regulations.
36'
The Visa operating regulations prohibit a merchant from storing or
retaining cardholder information.362 Sovereign alleged that BJ's failed to
comply with this requirement because the computer program BJ's used
to process credit card sales retained card numbers, instead of keeping
them in the system only during the validation process. 363 BJ's failure to
properly secure its customers' data364 led to theft of credit card numbers
and unauthorized charges. 365  Sovereign sued BJ's 366 on three counts:
negligence, breach of contract, and equitable indemnification.36 7
Only the negligence claim survived summary judgment. 368  The
court found that BJ's owed Sovereign a duty of care when dealing with
its customers' information. 369 A relationship existed between Sovereign
and BJ's because both participated in the Visa network. 370 The risk that
theft could result from violating the Visa operating agreement was
foreseeable; the agreement prohibited a merchant from storing customer
data for this very reason.37' BJ's was in the best position to make sure
that data was not stolen by complying with Visa's requirement that data
is stored only as long as needed to complete a transaction.372 Finally, the
public benefits from imposing a duty on BJ's in this situation. If
merchants are not required to abide by security standards, consumers will
lose faith in credit transactions.3 73 For these reasons, the court found that
BJ's owed the issuing bank a duty of care when processing credit
transactions and denied BJ's motion to dismiss.374
purposes of this discussion.
361. Id.
362. Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
363. Id. at 187.
364. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
365. Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90.
366. Sovereign also sued the "acquiring member," Fifth Third, on the same counts.
Id. at 190.
367. Id.
368. Id. The contract claim was dismissed because BJ's negotiated the BJ's merchant
contract with Fifth Third, not Sovereign, and the BJ's merchant contract excluded third
parties as beneficiaries. Id. Sovereign's contract claim against Fifth Third, on the other
hand, survived summary judgment because Fifth Third was a party to the contract. Id.
The equitable indemnification claims against both BJ's and Fifth Third were dismissed
because Sovereign failed to establish it had a duty to pay for the unauthorized use of its
cards. Id. Finally, Sovereign's negligence claim against Fifth Third was dismissed
because the court ruled that the economic loss doctrine barred the claim. Id.
369. Id. at 193.




374. Id. at 206.
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Although Sovereign Bank375 does suggest that merchants own a duty
of care to issuing members when processing consumer credit card
purchases, it does not speak to any duty owed directly by a merchant to
an individual cardholder. Further, it is unclear whether the economic
loss doctrine bars a negligence claim against a merchant. Sovereign
Bank does not address the economic loss doctrine in relationship to the
negligence action against a merchant, but does hold that it prevents
recovery from an acquiring member for negligence.37 6 However, in
Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank,
377
another case resulting from BJ's same information security failures, the
court held that the economic loss doctrine prevents negligence claims
against both the merchant and the acquiring member.378 Future litigation
will determine how broad a merchant's duty to protect personal
information is and to whom that duty extends.
V. Analysis and Recommendations
A. All Companies Collecting and Storing Personal Consumer Data
Should Develop a Company- Wide Strategy to Secure Electronic
Information
Even though information assets often account for the majority of
capital spending, few corporate boards understand the importance of
information systems and the role IT plays in shaping a company's
strategies.379 While most boards understand and apply established
principles in other areas of corporate management,3 8 ° the absence of clear
standards in IT governance leaves many Chief Information Officers with
the task of managing corporate information assets on their own.3 ' No
corporation would risk not auditing its books, yet many do not approach
IT governance in the same way.382 The first step in creating an effective
375. 395 F. Supp. 2d 183 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
376. Id.
377. 398 F. Supp. 2d 317 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
378. Id. at 336 n. 16 (stating that Ohio has adopted the economic loss rule). But see
Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 284 (D. Me. 2005)
(rejecting a motion to dismiss negligence claims, related to BJ's information security
failures, brought against an "acquiring member" and a "merchant").
379. See Richard Nolan & F. Warren McFarlan, Information Technology and the
Board of Directors, HARVARD Bus. REV., Oct. 2005, at 96.
380. Every corporate board is aware, for example, that its corporate accounting
practices must comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Id. at
98.
381. Id.
382. Id. It should be noted that some companies are beginning to realize that IT
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information security plan is for corporate directors to recognize that IT
governance is more than an "IT issue," in the same way that effective
corporate accounting is more than an "accounting issue." Both functions
are critical to success in today's business environment. Moreover, the
failure to recognize that effective management of information security is
just as important to a corporation's success as effective accounting
practices has consequences paramount to the legal issues inevitably
resulting from such failure.3 83
After management seriously commits to IT governance, the
company should develop a comprehensive, written information security
plan that considers security, privacy, and cybercrime against the
backdrop of its individual needs.38 4 The question of how a company
should go about creating its security plan has only one clear answer: it
depends.38 5 As the FTC Consent Orders and the GLB Security Rule
indicate, factors such as the company's size and complexity, the nature
of the company's activities, and the sensitivity of the personal
information collected from consumers all must be considered.
3 86
In general, the ability to design a plan to meet a company's specific
needs is beneficial because a strategy that works well for one business
may not work as well, or may be cost prohibitive, for another.387
Specific legislation, however, defines the minimum standards that
companies in particular industries must meet.388  Therefore, before
developing an appropriate information security policy, a company needs
management needs to be approached from a top-down perspective in the same way that
accounting practices, compensation decisions, and corporate governance are. Mellon
Financial, Novell, Home Depot, Procter & Gamble, Wal-Mart, and FedEx have all
created IT governance committees similar to their audit, compensation and governance
committees. Id.
383. See WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 154 (suggesting business may not be
able to occur if information systems cannot be trusted).
384. WESTBY, supra note 23, at 2.
385. Nolan & McFarlan, supra note 379, at 98.
386. See, e.g., In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at
*6 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/
092305do0423160.pdf; 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a).
387. Nolan & McFarlan, supra note 379, at 98.
388. In addition to the legislation discussed in Part III, other legislation might also
dictate, at least in part, the security and privacy standards a company needs to meet. The
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act protects personal information belonging to
children under the age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006). The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act might apply to Internet Service Providers and telephone
companies. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). The Economic Espionage Act of 1996
protects the privacy of trade secrets. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act applies to corporations and contains provisions regarding data retention and
destruction, as well as internal controls pertaining to financial information. Pub. Law
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
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to identify applicable legislation 389 and determine what that legislation
requires. After legal requirements are identified, a company should
evaluate its own business needs. 390 Two business needs common to most
companies dealing with personal information are making sure that
customers feel confident that their personal information will be
protected, and protecting data valuable to the business's operations.
In developing a strategy for handling private consumer information,
the GLB Privacy Rule and the HIPAA Privacy Rule both present
valuable ideas. While the GLB Privacy Rule applies only to financial
institutions, 391 other companies might inspire trust in their consumers by
offering similar privacy notifications voluntarily. Cost must also be
considered in the development of a company's security plan.392
Additionally, a company should not make any promises regarding
consumer privacy that it cannot keep.393 While the HIPAA Privacy Rule
as a whole may not be part of a company's security plan if it is not
required, some of its principles are likely applicable. One of the most
effective methods of preventing identity theft is to avoid collecting
information that is not needed.394 The HIPAA Privacy Rule's "minimum
necessary" policies limit disclosure of personal information to only the
amount necessary to fulfill a given task.395 In particular a company
should avoid collecting and storing social security numbers, drivers
license numbers, and other identifiers.396 Finally, as suggested by the
GLB Privacy Rule, a company should be aware of its promises to
consumers when negotiating contracts with third parties.397
Additionally, a company should conduct a risk management
assessment to determine existing risks, the likelihood of attacks, and
389. In addition to the federal legislation discussed here, a company must be
conscious of applicable state laws and international laws that might affect it based on its
industry. See Prepared Remarks of Brad Smith, Senior Vice President, General Counsel
and Corporate Secretary, Microsoft, to Congressional Internet Caucus (Nov. 3, 2005)
[hereinafter Smith Remarks] (on file with author), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2OO5/novO5/11-03DataPrivacyPR.mspx
(follow "Brad Smith Address to Congressional Internet Caucus" hyperlink under
"Executive Speeches") (over 20 states have passed financial privacy laws since 2004).
390. See Nolan & McFarlan, supra note 379, at 96.
391. 15 U.S.C. § 6809 (2006).
392. E.g., id. § 3544(a)(2)(C) (stating FISMA requires the implementation of "cost-
effective methods").
393. See, e.g., In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS 123 (July 30, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf. (prohibiting misrepresentation
of privacy protection).
394. See Shostack Letter, supra note 345.
395. 45. C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(2) (2006).
396. See Shostack Letter, supra note 345.
397. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (2006).
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proper recovery methods.3 98 While the GLB Safeguards Rule only
applies to financial institutions, the FTC has recommended that Congress
consider extending it to all companies, regardless of whether or not they
are financial institutions.399 As suggested by the GLB Security Rule and
the FTC Consent Orders, an effective risk assessment should result in the
creation of administrative, technical, and physical safeguards aimed at
protecting the security, confidentiality, and integrity of data.4 °° Specific
safeguards are dependent upon the business needs of an individual
organization and the best practices of its industry.40 1 Regardless of the
specific safeguards that are implemented, employee training, network
and software design, data storage, data transmission, attack response and
prevention, hardware security, and employee access should all be
addressed.4 °2
Even though compliance with FISMA by covered government
agencies is not as good as the federal government would like, 403 its
accountability requirements should be considered by a company
developing a security plan. FISMA places ownership of an agency's
information security program with one person.40 4 Likewise, a company
should assign ownership and responsibility for the implementation of its
security plan, although developed from an organizational standpoint, to
one person or office. In addition to executing the security plan, this
person, with proper input from management, should be charged with the
continual development and refinement of the organization's risk
management plan.40 5  The security plan should be audited by both
internal and external sources. An effective security plan should provide
for outside audits by a qualified individual or organization on a regular
basis. 40 6  The organization's security plan must grow with the
organization and respond to changes in technology.
398. WESTBY, supra note 23, at 22.
399. Press Release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Testifies on Data Security and
Identity Theft (June 16, 2005) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/
datasectest.htm.
400. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2006). See also In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-
4148, 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *4 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0423160/092305do0423160.pdf.
401. See Nolan & McFarlan, supra note 379, at 96 (describing four strategies an
organization might employ based on the strategic impact of IT on the organization).
402. See In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *5. See also 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.310 and 164.312.
403. Cybersecurity Report, supra note 248.
404. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(3) (2006).
405. See Tower, supra note 341 (describing charges filed against a company that
failed to appropriately adjust its security measures to reflect changes in its technology).
406. The FTC Consent Orders require independent audits at least every other year.
See, e.g., In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 2005 FTC LEXIS 134, at *5-6.
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Even the best security plan and most effective implementation and
management do not guarantee that a corporation will avoid a data
security breach. 40 7 A cyber-insurance policy helps a company protect
itself from risks that could not be determined from the risk management
assessment and risks that the security plan was designed to stop, but did
not.40 8 Cyber-insurance is relatively new and risk can be difficult to
determine because the interconnected nature of information systems
presents risks beyond the individual company.40 9  As a result,
underwriters are hesitant to write large policies.410  However, as
underwriters gain more experience in the area of cyber-insurance, larger
policies will become available to supplement a company's security
policy.
4 11
Finally, if a security breach does occur, a company should contact
the customers who are affected or potentially affected.4 12  Since
consumers might not discover identity theft until months or years after
the theft occurs, failure to disclose potential data breaches hinders the
413
fight against cybercrime. Although a company might be reluctant to
disclose information that might harm its public image, disclosure would
not only make recovering from identity theft easier for affected
customers, it would also minimize the company's exposure. Disclosure
is already required by law in California4 14 and federal bills requiring
disclosure are being considered by Congress.415
B. Uniform Legislation: The Need For Minimal Requirements
[P]ersonal information collected at a bank is covered by one privacy
standard, but that same information collected by a hospital is covered
by a different standard. If that information is from a child under the
age of 13, it's protected by yet another standard if it's collected
online, but it may not be protected at all if it's collected offline....
407. Lawrence A. Gordon, Martin P. Loeb, & Tashfeen Sohail, A Framework for
Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk Management, 46 COMM. ACM 81, 84 (2003).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 82-84.
410. Id. at 84.
411. Id. at83.
412. When ID Theft Hits: What to do, MSNBC ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2003,
http://www.acm.org/usacm/Issues/WhenIDthefthits.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006)
(delays in closing accounts can be costly for victims of identity theft).
413. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 150 (information sharing is an important
component of cyber security).
414. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2006) (requiring notification of a data breach
that puts personal information at risk to any citizen of California).
415. See, e.g., Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2005, S. 751, 109th Cong.
(2005) (requiring all persons engaged in interstate commerce to disclose data breaches
containing personal information).
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Yet, despite all of these legal distinctions, the consequences of
misuse [of personal information] ... could be exactly the same in
each scenario.
416
Although some common standards emerge from existing legislation,
there is still much confusion in the area of data security.417 In some
industries, such as health care, the law requires strict compliance with
very specific standards.41 8  Yet in other instances, there is little or no
applicable legislation. Data security standards also can be different
within an industry.419 Regardless of how a company collects private
information or the nature of the company's relationship with the owner
of the information, once a company collets data it is often all stored in
the same databases and transported over the same networks. 420 Federal
legislation establishing minimal data security standards for personal
information would force all companies to take data security seriously.
On the other hand, legislation that is too inclusive could be cost
prohibitive and ineffective.421 Some suggest the HIPAA Safeguards Rule
created confusion in the health care industry.422  Although the goal of
HIPAA is to make electronic transfers more prevalent and reduce
costs, 423 implementation of new security policies is costly in itself.
Further, companies cannot yet look to standards boards for data security
rules in the same way they can look to accounting standards boards for
accounting rules.424  While these standards boards are beginning to
develop,425 some argue that standards boards need to be allowed to set
ground rules before Congress intervenes with uniform data security
requirements.426
Any forthcoming legislation must walk the line between providing
effective data security and crippling the advantages created by the
Internet and e-business. If legislation is too specific, businesses may not
be able to effectively interact with legitimate customers. Without a
uniform baseline for data security standards, however, the confusion that
416. See Smith Remarks, supra note 389.
417. Id. (discussing inconsistency between different federal and state laws).
418. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2006).
419. See 15 U.S.C. § 6809 (2006) (requiring different levels of protection for
"consumers" and "customers").
420. See, e.g., Complaint at *2, In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091, 2003 FTC LEXIS
123, (July 30, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guesscomp.pdf.
42 1. See WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 44.
422. Id. (arguing that government needs to better understand cyber security before
passing legislation).
423. WESTBY, SECURITY, supra note 67, at 38.
424. Kevin Novack, Reconsider Cybersecurity Regulation, NETWORK COMPUTING,
Oct. 30, 2003, at S12.
425. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
426. Novack, supra note 424, at S 12.
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currently exists will continue, and businesses not currently covered by
legislation will have little incentive to spend time and money developing
data security systems. While a uniform minimum level of data security
is needed, some information is more sensitive and requires additional
considerations. Legislation such as HIPAA and the GLB Act could still
provide greater protection for specific industries than a uniform standard
would require.
Uniform legislation should revolve around four considerations.
First, data is data, regardless of how it is collected or the nature of its
owner's relationship to the collecting entity.4 27  Uniform legislation
should apply consistent standards to personal information, based on the
sensitivity of the information. Second, a one-size-fits-all approach to
data security will not work. Therefore, uniform legislation should
require management to create data security policies, but not dictate what
technology must be used or specify methods by which policies must be
implemented.428  While the legislation should be flexible, it also must
have strong enforcement policies. 429 Third, if data is never in harm's
way, it cannot be stolen. Uniform legislation, like HIPAA's "minimum
necessary" standard, should limit the type of personal information
collected to that which is necessary. If a company does not have a
legitimate business need for specific information, it should not collect it.
Fourth, uniform data security legislation should require a company to
notify consumers if it suffers a data breach and consumers' personal data
is exposed or potentially exposed.430  No data security program can
provide total protection against a data breach. 431 However, the quicker a
potential identity theft victim learns he or she has been victimized, the
sooner he or she can fight back. Uniform legislation that addresses these
concerns, while at the same time gives businesses flexibility in
developing an appropriate data security plan, will provide clarity in the
area of data security without frustrating the benefits technology brings to
today's business environment.
427. See Smith Remarks, supra note 389 (suggesting the potential risks to consumers
are the same regardless of how data is collected).
428. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2006) (suggesting that an information security
program should be appropriate for a company's size, complexity, industry, and
activities).
429. See WESTBY, PRIVACY, supra note 67, at 45 (suggesting compliance with HIPAA
is taken seriously because criminal and civil penalties exist).
430. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2006).
431. See Gordon, Loeb & Tashfeen, supra note 407, at 84.
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VI. Conclusion
Technology has changed the way business is done. With these
changes come new challenges. It is undeniable that information drives
business today, even in spite of existing challenges.432  When a bank
robber named Willie Sutton was asked why he robbed banks, he replied,
"[b]ecause that's where the money is."'433  Today, information has
replaced money and databases have replaced banks. Safes and locks
have been replaced by encryption and firewalls, but the need for effective
security and the potential for harm is just as great, if not greater. While
identity theft existed and was a problem even before the birth of the
Internet, recent data breaches have called attention to the fact that
technology allows thieves to exploit more victims in less time than ever
before.
434
Even if we ignore the fact that technology changes at a rapid pace,
effective data security is very dependent upon each individual company's
business, making a one-size-fits-all approach to information security
unworkable. Legal standards must be flexible enough to apply to
different businesses, yet strict enough to effect compliance. The Internet
has destroyed barriers to entry and opened the marketplace, allowing
companies of all sizes to compete in the virtual business world. The
challenge for future legal standards is to strike a balance that allows the
advantages currently provided by e-business, while encouraging all
companies to effectively protect consumer information.
The fight to control identity theft requires corporations to take data
security and customer privacy seriously.435 Effective laws can encourage
corporate participation. However, corporate responsibly is only half of
the battle. Consumers need to take proactive measures to protect
themselves from identity theft.436 Users transmitting data online need to
educate themselves about Internet security.4 37 Consumers should look
for privacy policies on websites, read them, and do business only with
reputable companies.438 Internet users should install firewalls and virus
protection programs on their computers and update these regularly.439
Consumers should opt out of third party information sharing and be
selective about distributing personal information.4 4 °
432. WESTBY, supra note 23, at 12.
433. Levy & Stone, supra note 1.
434. See id.
435. See WESTBY, supra note 23.
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It is clear that any business collecting or storing its consumers'
personal data has to take steps to adequately protect that data. However,
the legal duty that currently exists varies drastically by industry.441
Further, the applicable legal duty is often unclear as new technology
creates new legal questions.442 The enactment of uniform legal standards
can provide a starting point in the battle to secure personal data and force
businesses to develop security plans. However, the problems associated
with securing personal information will not be remedied without an
active commitment by the business community and the consuming public
to attack the problem from a practical standpoint as well as a legal
standpoint.
441. See generally supra Part III.
442. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 183,
187 (M.D. Pa, 2005).
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